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Our Toil Respite Only: 
Woolf, Diamond, and the 
Difficulty of Reality*
❦
Karen Zumhagen-Yekplé
There is nothing…that answers, or bears on, the problems of life. But the 
very fact that in these books, as we may imagine them, there are answers to 
every imaginable question can help us to transform our own desire for an 
answer to the problem of life. (Cora Diamond, “Introduction to ‘Having 
a Rough Story About What Moral Philosophy Is’” 129)
In The Phantom Table, Ann Banfield examines Virginia Woolf’s preoc-
cupation—and that of Bloomsbury more generally—with the episte-
mological questions raised in Cambridge philosophy during the first 
quarter of the 20th century. The era that provides the context for her 
inquiry is one Banfield places “squarely within the period of Russell, 
which ends with Wittgenstein’s ascendancy.” And yet, she continues, 
“this does not prevent the Tractatus [Logico-Philosophicus] from play-
ing a role in our reconstruction of Bloomsbury’s intellectual world,” 
since its “conceptions, language and dominant metaphors find their 
counterparts in Woolf, not because she came under its influence, but 
because she shared its ways of thinking” (9).
Banfield astutely posits these shared ways of thinking (the result 
of fortuitous, perhaps zeitgeistig philosophical kinship rather than any 
direct mutual influence), and then lets them rest without pursuing 
Many thanks to Reshef Agam-Segal, Louise Hornby, YiPing Ong and an anonymous 
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also grateful for support from Newcomb College Institute and Committee on Research 
at Tulane, and the Department of Comparative Literature at Harvard.
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them further. Such concerns, after all, fall outside the purview of her 
work in that book on Woolf’s engagement with Russell, Moore and 
Fry, and the philosophical background of Bloomsbury. But account-
ing for salient affinities between the author of the Tractatus and his 
high-modernist literary contemporaries, especially Woolf, Joyce, Kafka, 
and Musil, has figured centrally in my own efforts to reframe under-
standings of the significance of Wittgenstein’s philosophy for studies 
in modernism more generally.1
In this essay, my endeavors to bring out the shared ways of thinking 
Banfield points to are based not on direct parallel readings of Witt-
genstein and Woolf, nor indeed on any full reading of the Tractatus. 
Instead, I read Woolf’s To the Lighthouse together with philosopher 
Cora Diamond’s writing on literature and moral life, writing that is 
nonetheless deeply marked by her inheritance from Wittgenstein. 
I first attend to Woolf’s commitment (one I argue she shares with 
Wittgenstein) to grappling with what I take to be signature issues 
of modernism: question, quest, and a longing for vision or revised 
understanding as a way of confronting the difficulty of reality. I 
then probe Woolf’s engagement with these issues by reading her 
novel in light of Diamond’s essay “The Difficulty of Philosophy and 
the Difficulty of Reality.” Diamond’s keen insights about literature’s 
capacity for ethical instruction, and her discussion in that essay of 
the experience of an ordinary sublime so painful or astonishing that 
1Elsewhere I have offered more directly comparative readings of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy and the literary productions of these contemporaries. See, for example, 
“The Everyday’s Fabulous Beyond: Nonsense, Parable, and the Ethics of the Literary in 
Kafka and Wittgenstein,” and “The World as Bloom Found It: “Ithaca,” the Tractatus, 
and ‘looking more than once for the solution of difficult problems in imaginary or 
real life.’” In these essays, I argue that the so-called “resolute” or “New Wittgensteinian” 
interpretive approach to Wittgenstein scholarship developed by Diamond and James 
Conant puts us in a better position to recognize the kind of affinities Banfield points 
to. I argue that this program of Wittgenstein scholarship offers new dimensions for 
understanding Witttgenstein’s relationship to literary modernism that are otherwise 
unavailable through more standard readings of the Tractatus (advanced by such 
philosophers as Anscombe, Hacker, Pears, Monk, for example). By emphasizing the 
relationship between the method Wittgenstein employs in the book and its unorthodox 
aesthetic form; highlighting the disjunction between the purported logical-philosophical 
treatise and Wittgenstein’s conception of the overall ethical aim of the book; and by 
calling our attention to the different orders of difficulty and secular-sacred conversional 
aspirations at work in it, resolute readings put us in a position to see Wittgenstein’s 
1921 work of philosophy as a complex modernist puzzle as revolutionary in its literary 
sensibilities, formal ambition, experimentalism and dedication to everyday language’s 
myriad possibilities and transformative yearning as the “big” works that we have come 
to see as exemplary of the high-modernist literary canon. For other notable studies on 
Wittgenstein in a modernist context, see Janik and Toulmin; Fischer; Perloff; North; 
LeMahieu; Mulhall; Gibson and Huemer; Matar, Ware, and Quigley.
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it resists our understanding and categories of thought, illuminate a 
new philosophical context in which to understand more clearly and 
profoundly the stakes and aims of Woolf’s novel.2
Reading Woolf alongside Diamond also prompts us to recognize 
important ways in which matters that lie at the heart of To the Light-
house intersect with the Wittgensteinian preoccupations that inform 
Diamond’s own thinking—concerns about the ethics of difficulty; 
skepticism about what other people think and feel; the search for 
communicative and existential clarity; the capacity of literature and 
fairy tale to convey a sense of beauty or of the “terrible” in the world; 
the status of expressions of our ethical experience as necessarily non-
sensical; a longing for the sense of wholeness, transformative under-
standing, wonder, safety, and peace to stave off illusion or despair.3 
One important subsidiary effect of looking at Woolf and Diamond 
together is that doing so also allows us to make significant oblique 
connections between Woolf’s thinking and Wittgenstein’s, connections 
that continue to bring into focus the philosophical sympathies that 
attest to the mutual relevance of their peculiar brands of modernism.
I begin by locating the source of the connections among Woolf, 
Diamond, and Wittgenstein in their shared focus on difficulty, ques-
tion and quest because as I see it, if, as Banfield asserts, Wittgenstein’s 
dominant philosophical conceptions and metaphors find counterparts 
in Woolf, it is due in no small part to the fact that both authors labored 
under the influence of Tolstoy, Dostoevsky and (at least in Woolf’s 
case) Chekhov in their attempts to grapple with what Wittgenstein 
calls “the problem of life” (TLP 6.521).4 These are writers that Woolf 
extols in “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown” and “Modern Fiction” for 
their attention to the human soul and spirit. As Diamond reminds 
us, Wittgenstein’s own admiration of Tolstoy (and the ways he draws 
upon that writer’s methods in his own philosophy) owes in large part 
to his appreciation of the way Tolstoy deals with the difficulty of “the 
2For extended discussion of Diamond’s ethical thinking and the ordinary sublime, 
see Dahl.
3For further discussions of the larger lessons Diamond draws from Wittgenstein in 
her writing on ethics and literature, see especially Crary, “Introduction,” Wittgenstein 
and the Moral Life: Essays in Honor of Cora Diamond and the essays compiled in that col-
lection, and Mulhall.
4For another perspective on modernism’s engagement with question and quest, see 
DiBattista. I attend more fully to DiBattista’s arguments in that essay in my “The World 
as Bloom Found It.”
5Diamond points to Wittgenstein’s preference for Tolstoy’s Hadji Murad to his Res-
urrection to indicate his partiality; for works that “turn their back on the reader” and 
antipathy to those which strive more heavy-handedly to tell us what to think or feel. 
See her “Introduction” 129. In spite of her admiration of the Russian philosophical 
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character of the world” and gives “a sense of the mysteriousness of life, 
and the way life goes…” in the absence of explicitly ethical statements 
about how we ought to reflect upon these things.5 “Wittgenstein’s own 
‘habit of reading,’” Diamond writes, “…was a reading for absences; 
and he writes absences, or so I am suggesting” (“Introduction,” 130–1). 
I will not be concerned with Woolf’s “Great Russians” here, but with 
her own investment in writing absences, and in keeping alive in her 
novelistic works the “inconclusiveness of the Russian mind” and what 
she describes as “the sense that there is no answer, that if honestly 
examined, life presents question after question which must be left to 
sound on and on after the story is over in hopeless interrogation that 
fills us with a deep, and finally it may be with a resentful, despair” 
(“Modern Fiction” 163).
Diamond’s approach to Wittgenstein, I argue elsewhere, allows us to 
see the Tractatus as a modernist puzzle text, one whose author uses a 
challenging parabolic mode of instruction in order to prompt his read-
ers to take up the ethical and philosophical work that will (ultimately, 
ideally) lead them to make a change in worldview that will enable 
them to handle the most difficult questions of life and the search 
for solutions.6 The book’s exegetical challenge plays a central role in 
Wittgenstein’s ethical project of engaging readers in the therapeutic 
activity of clarification he saw as philosophy’s true task.
Diamond reads the Tractatus not as representing Wittgenstein’s 
attempt to advance a metaphysical doctrine about the relation between 
language and world, but as a book striving to effect a radical change 
in the attitude the reader takes toward the world, and her concep-
tion of how philosophy should be practiced. According to the line of 
interpretation Diamond has elaborated along with James Conant, the 
Tractatus is not a work of doctrine, but a carefully wrought aesthetic 
medium for a mode of instruction Wittgenstein saw as serving an 
ethical aim. The work advances no theory, but instead offers readers 
novel and her claim that her own ideas amounted to a sort of “theory” (“Modern Fic-
tion”) or a “philosophy” (A Sketch of the Past), Woolf, too, resisted systematic or insti-
tutionalized philosophies and was suspicious of novels that seek overt or un-nuanced 
applications of philosophical ideas. “[W]hen philosophy is not consumed in a novel,” 
she writes, “when we can underline this phrase with a pencil, and cut out that exhorta-
tion with a pair of scissors and paste the whole into a system, it is safe to say that there 
is something wrong with the philosophy or with the novel or with both.” “The Novels 
of George Meredith” (1918) 234. See also “Philosophy in Fiction” (1918).
6For further discussion of the Tractatus as a modernist puzzle, see my “The World as 
Bloom Found It.” For discussions of Diamond’s role in the development of what the 
“resolute” approach to Wittgenstein’s philosophy and the way that approach diverges 
from more traditional readings, see works by Diamond, Conant and Diamond, Crary 
and Read; Friedlander; Read and Lavery; and Cahill.
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a mock-doctrine, one to be cast aside once it has served its elucidatory 
aim: of leading readers to eschew metaphysical theories and take up 
an attentive work on the self (work of a deeper sort of difficulty than 
the more straightforward intellectual challenge posed by his apparent 
logico-philosophical treatise) aimed at bringing about a conversional 
shift in outlook that will lead them to “see the world in the right 
way,” as he puts it (TLP 6.54).7 The metaphysical theory the Tractatus 
would seem to proffer is one calculated to display to readers their 
7Wittgenstein’s own characteristic lack of specificity about the precise nature of the 
kind of work on the self the Tractatus demands of its readers speaks to Wittgenstein’s 
own engagement in the modernist uses of vagueness that Megan Quigley explores in 
her 2015 Modernist Fiction and Vagueness (though this salient instance of Wittgenstein’s 
use of vagueness is not addressed in that book). One can gain a better understanding 
of the kind of transformative personal work Wittgenstein has in mind by looking at 
his remarks collected in Culture and Value about character, courage and confession, as 
well as remarks Wittgenstein made in conversations with Rhees and Drury and those 
described in personal recollections of Wittgenstein by Fania Pascal and Rowland Hutt 
(See Rhees). Wittgenstein was interested in self-reflection and in first-person confes-
sional expression as a means of warding off self-deception and evasion with clarity, 
acceptance and courage. His view that confession can play an important role in our 
efforts to take our lives in a new direction has much to tell us about the kind of ethical 
teaching he sought to impart to his readers in the Tractatus, since his views about the 
difficult process of self-assessment that confession and other forms of first-personal 
disclosure entail bears a deep resemblance to the process of overcoming illusion to-
ward which he aims to lead his readers. True, the Tractatus itself can hardly be called 
a confessional work. Among the numbered propositions that make up the book, we 
find neither the author’s personal reflections nor any hint of the factual account of 
his life that we might expect a strictly confessional narrative to contain. Wittgenstein 
engages in first-person expression only at the very beginning and the very end of the 
book, and then only in an extremely abbreviated fashion. And yet, Wittgenstein’s 
use of the first-person is no merely passing rhetorical move. In a conversation with 
Friedrich Waismann of the Vienna Circle, Wittgenstein emphasizes the importance of 
his use of the first-person, describing it as “...something very essential,” “Here there is 
nothing to be stated anymore,” he continues, “all I can do is step forth and speak in 
the first person” (Waismann 117). Wittgenstein’s view of the importance of first-person 
voice reminds us that while the Tractatus is not, strictly speaking, a confessional work, 
it is nonetheless a book written from the point of view of an author who himself saw 
confession as a valuable move toward combating illusion and attaining in life the kind 
of clarity which he hoped would also carry over into understanding of language and 
philosophy. I want to suggest here that we take the jist of Wittgenstein’s remark at the 
end of the Tractatus—that it is only by overcoming our illusions, and thus also our 
tendency to engage in certain kinds of nonsense, that we can come to see the world 
aright— in light of his later claim that “confession has to be part of a new life” (CV 18). 
A point of agreement among Conant, Kremer and Cahill (who discuss the ethical aim 
of the Tractatus in terms of Kierkegaard, Augustine, and Heidegger respectively) is that 
Wittgenstein strives indirectly to foster virtues vis-à-vis our use of language by bringing 
us to see that we are responsible for speaking either sense or nonsense, depending on 
whether we give meaning to all of the signs in our propositions. The kind of authentic-
ity associated with not fleeing this responsibility is connected to virtues like courage, 
character, humility, integrity, and honesty. For a different discussion of Wittgenstein 
and first-person expression, see Yi-Ping Ong, “Lectures on Ethics: Wittgenstein and 
Kafka,” in Wittgenstein and Modernism.
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own misled tendency to succumb to an attraction to the metaphysi-
cal nonsense from which he aims to deliver them with the help of 
his book’s strange method. Wittgenstein contrives a work of logico-
philosophical nonsense to use as a metaphysical foil: He first draws 
readers temporarily into taking seriously the illusion that what he is 
saying makes sense, only then to explode this illusion from within, 
getting readers to recognize it for the illusion it is, by showing them 
that the sentences that have seduced them into thinking they make 
sense are simply meaningless.
Diamond argues that we will misunderstand Wittgenstein’s aim 
and method in the Tractatus unless we take seriously his enigmatic 
claim at the end of the book that all of its constitutive sentences 
are “simply nonsense” (TLP 6.54).8 Taking Wittgenstein at his word 
on that count means working to overcome our attraction to these 
sentences as he says we should. For Diamond, we really are to throw 
them away—along with the figurative ladder Wittgenstein invokes in 
the book’s penultimate proposition—once they have served what he 
claims is their “clarificatory” transformative purpose of leading us out 
of our philosophical and personal confusion. For Diamond, it is not 
the book’s nonsensical propositions that we must try to understand 
(they are nonsense; there can be no understanding them) but their 
author, a self-conscious utterer of nonsense who aims to teach the 
reader “to pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something that 
is patent nonsense” (Philosophical Investigations §464). To understand 
this speaker of nonsense, as any other, we must “enter imaginatively,” 
as she describes it, into what it would be to take nonsense for sense:
…the Tractatus, in its understanding of itself as addressed to those who 
are in the grip of philosophical nonsense, and in its understanding of the 
kind of demands it makes on its readers, supposes a kind of imaginative 
activity, an exercise of the capacity to enter into the taking of nonsense 
for sense, of the capacity to share imaginatively the inclination to think 
that one is thinking something in it. If I could not as it were see your non-
sense as sense, imaginatively let myself feel its attractiveness, I could not 
understand you. And that is a very particular use of imagination (“Ethics 
and Imagination” 158).
Building upon Diamond’s approach to Wittgenstein within stud-
ies of Woolf allows us to attend to the mutually enlightening ways in 
which both writers are enlivened by modernism’s trademark difficulty 
8At TLP 6.54, Wittgenstein writes: “My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who 
understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through 
them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has 
climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly.” 
1106 Karen Zumhagen-YeKplé
on the one hand, and, on the other, by a less-explored aspect I argue 
is equally definitive: secular high modernism’s seemingly incongru-
ous attraction to varieties of spiritual and transcendent experience, 
manifested in an obsession with the transformative power of puzzles, 
riddles, unanswerable questions and quests for solutions. Woolf’s and 
Wittgenstein’s deployment of difficulty bears on the ethical weight of 
their decidedly secular-spiritual engagement with ordinary language 
and life—as something fraught with inconclusive or illusory searches 
for meaning, the contemplation of the world sub specie aeterni (Tractatus 
6.45) and coming to “see the world in the right way” (Tractatus 6.54), 
in Wittgenstein’s terms, and grasping the vague and elusive “IT” that 
is the deictic object of so much contemplation and search in Woolf.9
On February 27, 1926, for example—around the time she was com-
posing the scene of Mrs. Ramsay’s solitary meditation in “The Window” 
section of To the Lighthouse—Woolf expresses her own attraction to 
questions and quests for the peace of discovery and resolution, and a 
longing for what Wittgenstein calls the “mystical feeling…of the world 
as a limited whole” (Tractatus 6.45):
…I have some restless searcher in me. Why is there not a discovery in life? 
Something one can lay hands on and say “This is it”? My depression is a 
harassed feeling. I’m looking; but that’s not it—that’s not it. What is it? 
And shall I die before I find it? Then (as I was walking through Russell 
Square last night) I see the mountains in the sky: the great clouds and 
the moon which is risen over Persia; I have a great and astonishing sense 
of something there, which is “it.” It is not exactly beauty that I mean. It 
is that the thing is in itself enough: satisfactory; achieved. A sense of my 
own strangeness, walking on the earth is there too: of the infinite oddity 
of the human position; trotting along Russell Square with the moon up 
there and those mountain clouds. Who am I, what am I, and so on: these 
questions are always floating about in me: and then I bump against some 
exact fact—a letter, a person, and come to them again with a great sense 
of freshness. And so it goes on (Diary III 62–3).
Diamond’s attention to riddle and difficulty in modern letters 
extends beyond her focus on Wittgenstein’s peculiar use of difficulty 
in the Tractatus. For it also informs her moral thinking about the 
way literature like Woolf’s deals in unexpected ways with difficult 
ethical questions, asking its readers to deal with them in turn. The 
work of gaining clarity about oneself (and of coming to understand 
others and what is at stake in what they say, even when what they say 
9For a longer notebook meditation on seeing the world sub specie aeternitatis, see 
Wittgenstein, Culture and Value 4.
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makes no sense to us) that the Tractatus’s use of nonsense and overall 
transformative challenge requires on Diamond’s reading, involves a 
different, and deeper, sort of difficulty than the more straightforward 
intellectual challenge the logico-philosophical treatise poses on the 
surface. The difficulty both Wittgenstein and Woolf present in their 
works is expressive of a yearning for solutions to what Joyce’s Leo-
pold Bloom refers to in Ulysses as problems “of a different order of 
difficulty” (699). Such problems are related to the vast irresolvable 
questions of life’s meaning that Wittgenstein explores in the Tractatus 
(6.4312–6.521) and which, as Lily Briscoe puts it in To the Lighthouse, 
“traverse the sky of the soul perpetually” (164–5). Problems of this 
order exceed the multiple intellectual challenges or calls for erudi-
tion the self-consciously crafted “Big Works” of high modernism also 
notoriously entail. At stake within them is a search for answers to 
the enduring questions of existence: the meaning of life, problems 
of the self and other minds, the possibility of redemptive change, 
the contrast between ordinary life and language and its significance 
from the point of view of the higher. The longing for answers Woolf 
and Wittgenstein both tap into in their very different works is further 
complicated by their common tendency to “see every problem from a 
religious point of view,” as Wittgenstein once put it, in spite of their 
committed agnosticism or atheism (Drury 79).10
Woolf’s investment in question and quest is evident even in the 
most rigorously analytical searches conducted in her novels (think, 
for example, of Mr. Ramsay’s quest for successful logical-philosophical 
progression from A to Z, or—failing Z, to R) (37–38). Most notable 
is Lily Briscoe’s quest for fulfilling (even vindicating) creative vision 
and the longing for access to the mysterious private buzzing ‘hive’ of 
the other that she shares with the rest of the novel’s main characters 
vis-à-vis each other (55). Each of the searches that wend their way 
through the novel are fueled by an inchoate underlying desire to get 
at “it” by, as Woolf puts it in Orlando, “netting the wild goose,” the “fin 
in a waste of waters;” to make some kind of leap of faith or transfor-
mative shift able to bring about an enhanced clarity of outlook and 
understanding of life and the human condition, or at least peace from 
pain, loss and isolation (10–11). This (sometimes active, sometimes 
latent) yearning persists even in the presence of a more despairing 
intellectual recognition that no such transformative solutions to what 
10For a fuller discussion of Wittgenstein’s remark to his friend and former student, 
Maurice Drury, “I am not a religious man but I cannot help seeing every problem from 
a religious point of view,” see Winch.
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Wittgenstein describes in the Tractatus as the “riddle of life” are surely, 
entirely, permanently achievable (TLP 6.4312; 6.5).
For just as Woolf’s avowed lack of religious belief does not preclude 
her tendency to see problems from the “religious point of view” shown 
in her desire to represent a human yearning for a certain ethico-
spiritual engagement with the world, her doubt that the answers to 
life’s most nagging questions are attainable likewise does not prevent 
her from giving in to the temptation to pose these questions in a vari-
ety of possible formulations over and over again in her writing. The 
doubtful sense Jacob’s Room’s narrator voices in the pronouncement 
that “the problem is insoluble,” a sentiment Mrs. Ramsay echoes in 
To the Lighthouse, exposes the tension between hopeful longing and 
despair that characterizes the kind of questioning her works explore 
(JR 64; TLH 18).11
This tension is also evident in Woolf’s interludes about the vision-
aries in the apocalyptic “Time Passes” section of To the Lighthouse, in 
which she compresses time and dissolves the human ego into the 
sleep and dream of an historicized post-lapsarian night of the chaos 
of the Great War. In a Wittgensteinian vein, in the inter-chapter Woolf 
simultaneously evokes romantic transcendental visions of wholeness 
and mystical labor and deflates them as mere illusion:
It seemed now as if, touched by human penitence and all its toil, divine 
goodness had parted the curtain and displayed behind it, single, distinct, 
the hare erect; the wave falling; the boat rocking, which, did we deserve 
them, should be ours always. But alas, divine goodness, twitching the cord, 
draws the curtain; it does not please him; he covers his treasures in a 
drench of hail, and so breaks them, so confuses them that it seems impos-
sible that their calm should ever return or that we should ever compose 
from their fragments a perfect whole or read in the littered pieces the 
clear words of truth. For our penitence deserves a glimpse only; our toil 
respite only. (131–2)
At privileged epiphanic moments, the curtain of appearances is 
parted to reveal to humankind a sense of yearned-for peace, resolution, 
harmony and completeness (as recompense for our penitent toil). 
But divine providence imparts only brief, intermittent flashes of the 
mystical wholeness sought. The metaphysical questions posed by the 
figure of the visionary seeker of “Time Passes” remain indeterminate 
and unanswered. The many fragmented questions that accumulate 
11See TLP 6.5 “For an answer which cannot be expressed the question too cannot 
be expressed. The riddle does not exist. If a question can be put at all, then it can 
also be answered.”
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in Woolf’s oeuvre—here from The Years, for example: “Why—why—
why?” “Where did thought begin?” “Am I that, or am I this?” “Are we 
one, or are we separate?”—are presented “as if a puzzle were solved, 
and then broken” (133; 140; 160). Questions “as to what and why 
and wherefore,” “where to begin?,” “where are we going?,” “how do 
you explain it all?,” “What does it mean then, what can it all mean?” 
proliferate throughout To the Lighthouse (132; 161; 169; 182; 149). 
The elusiveness of the answers sought in the reiterated questions of 
“Time Passes” is something Woolf goes on to detail with self-conscious 
humor in Orlando:
Having asked then of man and of bird and the insects, for fish, men tell 
us, who have lived in green caves, solitary for years to hear them speak, 
never, never say, and so perhaps know what life is having asked them all 
and grown no wiser, but only older and colder (for did we not pray once 
in a way to wrap up in a book something so hard, so rare, one could swear 
it was life’s meaning?) back we must go and say straight out to the reader 
who waits a tiptoe to hear what life is—Alas, we don’t know. (271)
And as Orlando draws to a close, having reached “the present 
moment,” the wild goose still flies overhead, still sought, still unreach-
able. Woolf’s narrative thus works to keep its central enigmas intact. 
To questions like “…of what nature is death, and what nature life?” 
the narrative offers us answers like this: “Having waited well over half 
an hour for an answer to these questions, and none coming, let us 
get on with the story” (68).
II. The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy
According to Diamond’s reading, as I have described it, the Tractatus 
aims to lead readers out of philosophical and personal confusion and 
complacency and through a conversional process that would culmi-
nate (at least ideally) in an enlightened understanding and clearer 
vision of the world, life, philosophy and language. As I will emphasize 
shortly with reference to Diamond’s “The Difficulty of Reality and 
the Difficulty of Philosophy,” however, certain ideas that stem from 
Wittgenstein’s (and Cavell’s) thinking also point us toward instances 
in our experience of reality—the everyday reality that the Tractatus 
would have us see more clearly—when reality is such that it becomes 
somehow strangely resistant to our comprehension. And that this 
experience of non-clarity, indeed of unintelligibility, is (if paradoxi-
cally) a significant part of the everyday we struggle to see clearly. As 
I will show, Woolf’s To the Lighthouse explores the ways in which the 
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individual experience of an overwhelming sense of the difficulty of 
reality isolates people from each other. But her novel also points to 
ways in which insights into the experience of such difficulty can bring 
people together.
Woolf’s (and Wittgenstein’s) attraction to riddle, enigma and 
unanswered questions flourished under the influence of the work of 
writers like Tolstoy and Dostoevsky that took hold during the years 
of WWI, modernism’s cataclysmic epochal event.12 The First World 
War is also, of course, a central theme in Woolf’s three major novels 
of the 1920’s: Jacob’s Room, Mrs. Dalloway and To the Lighthouse. The 
devastating losses wrought by war and the everyday ravages of time’s 
passing haunt To the Lighthouse as a whole (Andrew, the oldest son of 
the Ramsay’s eight children, whose promise Mrs. Ramsay so anxiously 
strives to safeguard, is, we are told, “killed by the splinter of a shell 
instantly” (159).13 This news is delivered in the well-known brackets 
Woolf uses to report all the devastation that befalls the family during 
the ten intervening years as time passes between the novel’s first part, 
“The Window” and its last, “The Lighthouse.” In another bracketed 
report, the Ramsay’s oldest daughter, Prue, dies in childbirth. But in 
12In her Wittgenstein’s Ladder, Marjorie Perloff reads the Tractatus as a “war book,” 
the product of specific, historical circumstances (45). Indeed, the book was finished 
while Wittgenstein was fighting on the Eastern front and as a prisoner of war in Ca-
sino, Italy. During that time, Wittgenstein turned for solace to Tolstoy’s Confession and 
Gospel in Brief and was an avid reader of Dostoyevsky’s Brothers Karamazov (his habit of 
carrying The Gospel in Brief with him at all times on the Front earned him the moniker, 
“the man with the Gospels”). The kind of personal transformation Wittgenstein strove 
to attain while in daily confrontation with death at the Front and long after the war’s 
end (indeed, throughout his life) also surfaces as a strong theme in his philosophy. 
Ray Monk suggests that if Wittgenstein had spent the entire war behind the lines, the 
Tractatus would likely have remained what it was at its first inception of 1915: a treatise 
on the nature of logic (137). Remarks that show the ways of thinking Wittgenstein shares 
with Woolf, remarks having to do with grappling with the meaning of life; transcen-
dence, epiphanic insight, “the mystical,” the will, fate and about riddles and searches 
for solutions, first begin to appear in Wittgenstein’s notebooks (many of which are to 
be found in the final version of the Tractatus) only after he went to the front in 1916, 
taking Tolstoy and Dostoevsky along with him.
13In another essay, Diamond takes as a literary example Woolf’s account of Andrew 
Ramsay’s death (“A shell exploded. Twenty or thirty young men were blown up in 
France, among them Andrew Ramsay, whose death, mercifully, was instantaneous”) 
to bring out a point of resemblance between Wittgenstein’s writing about philosophy 
and mathematics and her own interest in expressions of ethics that involve few (if any) 
specifically moral words. Woolf’s sentence—which as Shuli Barzilai claims “serves to 
underscore (because, and not in spite of the inexact number) the importance of one 
particular life for one mother, one wife, or one friend”—Diamond points out, “might 
be a record of what happened, might express moral thought—which, depends on its 
use.” See Diamond, “Wittgenstein, Mathematics and Ethics: Resisting the Attractions 
of Realism” 244.
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spite of Mrs. Ramsay’s repeated exhortations to her “old antagonist, 
life,” to “stand still here” in an impossible suspension of coherence 
and still-life plenitude, each of the children whose innocence and 
promise Mrs. Ramsay so longs to protect must in the end (whether 
literally or figuratively), “grow up and lose it all” (63, 62). Mrs. Ram-
say’s almost uncanny preoccupation with this eventuality exceeds a 
simpler sense of a mother’s anticipatory nostalgia, something that any 
form of consolation or “realistic” rational perspective could stave off. 
Hers is a prescient apprehension of the truth of life as offering no 
such longed-for safety, no salvation, as something “terrible, hostile, 
and quick to pounce on you if you gave it a chance” (63). As Mrs. 
Ramsay perceives it,
…the monotonous fall of the waves on the beach, which for the most 
part beat a measured and soothing tattoo to her thoughts and seemed to 
repeat…I am guarding you—I am your support…at other times suddenly 
and unexpectedly…had no such kindly meaning, but like a ghostly roll of 
drums remorselessly beat the measure of life, made one think of the destruc-
tion of the island and its engulfment in the sea, and warned her…that it 
was all as ephemeral as a rainbow—this sound which had been obscured 
and concealed under the other sounds suddenly thundered hollow in her 
ears and made her look up with an impulse of terror. (19–20)
Mrs. Ramsay’s yearning for the solace of a religious belief in 
what Wittgenstein refers to as “absolute safety,” expressed during a 
moment of solitary meditation in an incantatory series of repeated 
phrases (“Children don’t forget, children don’t forget”…It will end, 
it will end…It will come, it will come”), culminates in an automatic 
utterance which surprises and dismays her: “We are all in the hands 
of the Lord” (66).14 She retracts this phrase just as quickly as a bit of 
nonsense, or at least an “insincerity slipping in among the truths” (67). 
For the language of religious salvation cannot comfort her either. The 
yearning for safety and stillness Mrs. Ramsay craves in her moment of 
de-personalized solitude becomes a longing for unity and coherence 
during the famous dinner of Boeuf en Daube that she carefully and 
anxiously orchestrates for her family and their invited guests toward 
the end of “The Window.” Seated together by candlelight around 
her daughter Rose’s inspired centerpiece creation, perplexing in its 
strange (and impermanent) beauty, the members of the dinner party 
14In his 1929 “Lecture on Ethics,” Wittgenstein offers two examples that represent for 
him the “experience par excellence” of ethical or absolute value. The first is the feeling of 
“wonder at the existence of the world” and the second is the “experience of feeling absolutely 
safe” (41–2). Both sentences are nonsense, representative of the “characteristic misuse 
of our language [that] runs through all ethical and religious expressions” (42). See also 
Diamond, “Wittgenstein on Religious Belief: The Gulfs Between Us.”
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are transformed into an illuminated modernist still life that gives their 
hostess passing comfort. For Mrs. Ramsay,
Everything seemed possible. Everything seemed right. Just now (but this can-
not last, she thought, dissociating herself from the moment while they were 
all talking about boots) just now she had reached security; she had hovered 
like a hawk suspended; like a flag floated in an element of joy which filled 
every nerve of her body fully and sweetly, not noisily, solemnly rather, for 
it arose, she thought, looking at them all eating there, from husband and 
children and friends; all of which rising in this profound stillness (she was 
helping William Bankes to one very small piece more, and peered into the 
depths of the earthenware pot) seemed now for no special reason to stay 
there like a smoke, like a fume rising upwards, holding them safe together. 
Nothing need be said; nothing could be said. There it was, all round them. 
It partook, she felt, carefully helping Mr. Bankes to a specially tender piece, 
of eternity; as she had already felt about something different once before 
that afternoon; there is a coherence in things, a stability; something, she 
meant, is immune from change, and shines out (she glanced at the window 
with its ripple of reflected lights) in the face of the flowing, the fleeting, 
the spectral, like a ruby; so that again tonight she had the feeling she had 
had once today, already, of peace, of rest. Of such moments, she thought, 
the thing is made that endures. (107)
But the still life is soon shattered; a pear (its shape reminiscent of 
Prue’s own doomed fecundity) is grabbed and consumed.15 That the 
view of life Wittgenstein describes as sub specie aeternitatis is only an 
illusion, however ardently longed for, is something Mrs. Ramsay already 
knows. Toward the end of “The Window,” Mrs. Ramsay looks back over 
the threshold at the fading communal dinner scene and pronounces 
it “already the past” (114). Her longed-for sense of safety, wholeness, 
stillness and suspension of time is something she only achieves in the 
novel in the stark tableau of death that Woolf gives us shortly after. In 
the characteristically compressed and abrupt fashion of “Time Passes,” 
we get this report: “[Mr. Ramsay, stumbling along a passage one dark 
morning stretched his arms out, but Mrs. Ramsay having died rather 
suddenly the night before, his arms, though stretched out, remained 
empty]” (132).
This bracketed remark follows directly on the heels of one of the 
main instantiations of the poignant disembodied narrative of “question-
ing and wondering” that becomes so pressing and prolific in “Time 
Passes” (130). Here, the experience of a harrowing difficulty of life 
is conveyed in an outpouring of fragmented questions whose answers 
15I owe my recognition of the relationship among the disruption of the still life, 
the shape of the pear and the shape of Prue’s fate to discussions with Elizabeth Abel.
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are always pending. In a downpouring of immense darkness, as lights 
and lives are extinguished and the cyclical lapping of sea waves inexo-
rably erodes the sands on which the characters once stood, a chorus 
of mystic visionary questioners paces the beach to “ask of the sea and 
sky what message they reported or what vision they affirmed…” (137). 
They seek to assuage their solitude in a quest for answers. Woolf writes:
Should any sleeper fancying that he might find on the beach an answer to 
his doubts, a sharer of his solitude, throw off his bedclothes and go down 
by himself to walk on the sand, no image with semblance of serving and 
divine promptitude comes ready to hand bringing the night to order and 
making the world reflect the compass of the soul. The hand dwindles in his 
hand; the voice bellows in his ear. Almost it would appear that it is useless 
in such confusion to ask the night those questions as to what, and why, and 
wherefore, which tempt the sleeper from his bed to seek an answer. (132)
Later in the interlude, Woolf writes:
That dream, of sharing, completing, of finding in solitude on the beach an 
answer, was then but a reflection in a mirror, and…to pace the beach was 
impossible; contemplation was unendurable; the mirror was broken. (138)
These passages call attention to what I have been describing as 
Woolf’s treatment in To the Lighthouse of a general sense of yearning 
for (always elusive) consoling answers to the big enduring questions 
of life. The first passage also speaks to a desire—one related to Mrs. 
Ramsay’s own—to fly in the face of the “terrible” in the world by exert-
ing a certain control over how things happen in it. The second passage 
from Woolf quoted above speaks of an “unendurable contemplation,” 
presenting a difficulty of understanding (and a loss of correspondence 
truth) in the figure of a broken mirror. These passages articulate 
problems related to the will and to the self’s unrecognizability to 
itself and to others. In doing so, they underline both Woolf’s narrative 
experiments with Russian-style questioning and her engagement with 
what Martha Nussbaum—in her essay on To the Lighthouse—calls the 
“venerable problem” of other minds, as well as with the character of 
human separateness that preoccupies Cavell (732).
Mrs. Ramsay’s outlook of joyful acceptance and coherence during 
the dinner scene, coupled with her desire to stop time and make the 
world reflect the “compass of the soul” is one we can view in terms 
of the Grimm tale, “The Fisherman and His Wife,” that Mrs. Ramsay 
reads distractedly and intermittently to her son, James, in the first 
part of the novel. The Grimm story offers us an important intertex-
tual point of contact between Woolf and Diamond. For it is to this 
same story that Diamond turns in her “Ethics, Imagination and the 
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Method of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus” in order to explore the sense of 
the “terrible” and of terrible evil as it works upon readers of the fairy 
tales that Wittgenstein found to be ethically powerful. Her discussion 
of the ethical weight of that tale is also meant to clarify Wittgenstein’s 
sense of the attitude toward the world he describes as “happy” (or in 
terms of its “unhappy” opposite) in the Tractatus and the notebooks 
he kept as he was writing it.
In the Grimm story, a fisherman captures an enchanted flounder 
and spares its life. Upon his return home, his wife, Ilsibil, demands he 
return to the flounder to ask him to grant her what quickly becomes a 
long series of wishes. Her initial desire to trade in her filthy shack for 
a cozy cottage soon gives way to wishes for increasing material wealth 
and power; first she demands to be king, then emperor, then pope. 
On the day she wakes up unable to bear that the rising and setting of 
the sun and the moon are beyond her control, she sends her reluctant 
husband back to the flounder with her final angry command that she 
“become like God.” The command elicits a supernatural gale and the 
wife’s abrupt return to her original squalor (Grimm 72–80).
For Diamond, the wife in the story, and what she goes on to want 
and to do, shows us the character of someone who takes an “unhappy” 
attitude toward life and the world as a whole that she argues is so 
central to Wittgenstein’s conception of ethics. A “happy” attitude is 
marked by an “acceptance of the independence of the world from 
one’s will…the acceptance of the fact that what happens, happens, 
that one’s willing this rather than that is merely another thing that 
happens and that one is in a sense ‘powerless’” (“EIMT” 154). In 
Ilsibil, however, we get a figure filled with “a deep dissatisfaction with 
the world’s not meeting the conditions she lays down” (“EIMT” 166). 
Diamond goes on to articulate the sense of “something terrible and 
sinister” that arises in her reading of “The Fisherman and his Wife,” 
starting from Ilsibil’s very first wish. This sense of terrible evil has noth-
ing to do with that wish on the surface—there is nothing particularly 
terrible, after all, about wanting to live in a clean cottage rather than 
a hovel. But Diamond suggests that the Grimm story presents us with 
16In his notes on anthropologist James Frazer’s description of 18th century Scottish 
rituals of sacrifice, Wittgenstein shows his own sense of the difference between natural 
and supernatural evil that Diamond points to. In his discussion of ritual and religious 
practice, he makes clear his interest in cases that might lead us to ask “whence the 
sense of something dark and terrible in what at one level may seem entirely innocent?” 
Wittgenstein writes: “I want to say: The deep, the sinister, do not depend on the his-
tory of the practice having been like this, for perhaps it was not like this at all; nor 
on the fact that it was perhaps or probably like this. Indeed, how is it that in general 
human sacrifice is so deep and sinister? …No, the deep and the sinister do not become 
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evil that functions on a variety of different levels.16 She distinguishes 
evil of a more mundane, inconsequential stripe—the kind of evil that 
lies “close to home,” something one might get used to, and evil that 
represents “something terrible, black and wholly alien that you cannot 
even approach” (“EIMT” 166). The sense of evil Grimms’s story gives 
us seems “to be justified by nothing that is as it were available on the 
surface of events….we have a sense of something dark and terrible 
‘within,’ as we might say” (“EIMT” 167).
Mrs. Ramsay’s benign will to control time and tide is, of course, also 
to be contrasted with what Diamond depicts as the more malevolent 
grabbiness of the fisherman’s wife. What distinguishes Mrs. Ramsay 
from the wife in the Grimm story is her consistent acknowledgement 
in Woolf’s novel of the world’s refusal to conform to any conditions 
she might lay down for it. This difference lies in her acceptance of the 
difficult reality that the sun and the moon will go on rising and setting 
even without her say-so. Yet I would argue that Mrs. Ramsay’s sense 
of fate is intimately connected to the fairy-tale ethics of the cosmic 
“terrible,” magical sea-churning force that the Grimm story gives us, 
a sense of “something terrible, black and wholly alien” that Diamond 
is keen to call our attention to in her discussion of the moral weight 
and imaginative capacity of the story (“EIMT” 166). The solemn atti-
tude of possibility, acceptance and peace that Mrs. Ramsay adopts in 
her moment of plenitude during the dinner scene in “The Window” 
is one of attachment and loyalty. Hers represents a “happy” attitude 
toward the world as a whole, in Wittgenstein’s sense. It goes without 
saying that Mrs. Ramsay does not represent the agent of terrible black-
ness that Ilsibil does in Diamond’s reading of the Grimm story. But in 
giving us a character so attuned to an uncanny force of the terrible 
in the world, Woolf nevertheless presents us with a proximity to what 
Diamond calls “the difficulty of reality.”
In “The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy,” 
Diamond builds upon Wittgenstein’s and Cavell’s ideas about the 
nonsense of expressions of ethical experience and the difficulty of 
understanding others to add another dimension of perplexity to the 
“different order” of difficulty I have already outlined above. This dif-
ficulty entails a bewilderment capable of stifling our hopeful or even 
apparent merely by our coming to know the history of the external action, rather it is 
we who ascribe them from an inner experience. […] When I see such a practice, or 
hear of it, it is like seeing a man speaking harshly to someone else over a trivial matter, 
and noticing from his tone of voice and facial expression that this man can on occasion 
be terrible. The impression that I receive here can be very deep and extraordinarily 
serious.” Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough 146.
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our most hopeless interrogation and yearning to grasp the difficulties 
of the world, and which replaces it with a stranger sense of wounded-
ness, confoundedness and isolation. It is a difficulty that has to do, in 
Woolf’s words, with an “unendurable contemplation” that stops us in 
our tracks with a complete inability to grasp reality at all. “A difficulty 
of reality,” for Diamond,
…is the experience in which we take something in reality to be resistant 
to our thinking it, or possibly to be painful in its inexplicability, difficult 
in that way, or perhaps awesome and astonishing in its inexplicability. We 
take things so. And the things we take so may simply not, to others, present 
that kind of difficulty, of being hard or impossible or agonizing to get one’s 
head around. (“Difficulty” 45–6)
Diamond’s essay seeks primarily to engage philosophically with 
J.M. Coetzee’s Tanner Lectures (which were later to form a part of 
his 2003 novel, Elizabeth Costello), and a set of philosophical responses 
to them now compiled in The Lives of Animals. Although she offers 
several literary examples from Czesław Miłosz, Ruth Klüge and Mary 
Mann to explore the range of phenomena she is concerned with, her 
notion of the difficulty of reality is rooted in a literary example associ-
ated with aspects of World War I that also inform both Wittgenstein’s 
and Woolf’s work: Ted Hughes’ poem “Six Young Men,” written in 
the late 1950’s.
At the heart of the poem is a 1914 photograph of six smiling men, 
seated in a spot intimately familiar to the speaker and eerily unchanged. 
All are profoundly alive: yet within six months of the snapshot, all are 
dead. Hughes’ poem captures life and death simultaneously in the 
fading keepsake exposure superimposed upon the “flash and rend-
ing” of war that falls onto these smiles now forty years “rotting into 
soil.” But Hughes brings out in the last stanza the horrible permanent 
contradiction that Diamond takes to the heart of her notion of a dif-
ficulty of reality:
That man’s not more alive whom you confront
And shake by the hand, see hale, hear speak loud
Than any of these six celluloid smiles are,
 Nor prehistoric or fabulous beast more dead;
No thought so vivid as their smoking blood:
To regard this photograph might well dement.
Such contradictory permanent horrors here
Smile from the single exposure and shoulder out
One’s own body from its instant and heat. (54–5; qtd. in “Difficulty” 44)
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What interests Diamond about the poem is not the way it grapples 
with the wonder at the world and yearning to understand it that Woolf 
thematizes throughout her novels (and which Wittgenstein offers as 
his example of his experience par excellence of ethical value in his “Lec-
ture on Ethics”) but with the experience of a sudden inability of the 
mind to encompass something which it encounters, the experience 
of near-madness in trying to bring together in thought what can’t be 
thought: the impossibility of anyone’s being more alive than these 
smiling men, and of nothing’s being more dead (“Difficulty” 44).
It is plainly possible, Diamond tells us, to describe the photo in 
Hughes’ poem so that it does not seem mind-boggling at all: here 
we have a snapshot of a group of men who died young in battle not 
long after the photo was taken. If we look at the picture that way, 
there is no problem about the adequacy of our concepts to describe 
it. The person faced with a difficulty of reality, however, finds himself 
isolated in linguistic and personal bewilderment, utterly shouldered 
out, in Hughes’ words, from his ordinary ways of comprehending the 
world and what happens in it. No amount of explanation can put into 
perspective this “shuddering awareness of living in the contradiction 
of death and life together” (“Difficulty” 73).
A difficulty of reality has to do with the capacity of reality not just 
to exceed our conceptual grasp but to present an agonizing inexpli-
cability, a resistance to our ordinary modes of thinking and talking. 
It is a difficulty marked by a coming apart of thought and reality, a 
repudiation of the ordinary that is nonetheless a feature of ordinary 
life, one that belongs to a flesh-and-blood everyday.
In “Modern Fiction,” Woolf claims that writers like Tolstoy and 
Dostoevsky see into this flesh-and-blood everyday “further than we 
do and without our gross impediments of vision.” In her own critical 
writing, she proposes new approaches to correcting the blindspots 
and myopia she sees as characteristic of the novels of the early 20th 
century. She calls for an improved focus on aspects of everyday life 
that novelists have previously ignored in their efforts to offer robust 
descriptions of reality. “Look within and life, it seems, is very far from 
being ‘like this,’” she writes. What she wants (from both an aesthetic 
and an ethical point of view) is “a different outline of form…difficult 
for us to grasp,” incomprehensible to her “materialist,” Edwardian 
predecessors (“Modern Fiction” 160–2). If modern novelists are to 
be realistic about “the spirit we live by, life itself,” they must learn to 
move beyond established convention, to attend to “the life of Monday 
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or Tuesday” in such a way as to “tolerate the spasmodic, the obscure, 
the fragmentary, the failure” (“Modern Fiction” 160; “Mr. Bennett 
and Mrs. Brown” 54). To faithfully represent “the thing we seek,” 
something she describes (admitting further indexical “vagueness”) as 
“life or spirit, truth or reality, this, the essential thing,” writers must 
look after the “little deviations which the human spirit seems to make 
from time to time.” They must turn their attention to the moments 
when “life escapes,” when it veers off course, refusing to be contained 
by traditional narrative and linguistic conventions (“Modern Fiction” 
159–60). For Woolf, realistically representing the complexity and mys-
tery of human character and “what life is really like,” means focusing 
on the oddities and anomalies of everyday human existence, and 
attending closely to the linguist “nonsense” that arises in our attempts 
to describe or attest to various quests for meaning. “Is it not the task 
of the novelist,” she asks, “to convey this varying, this unknown and 
uncircumscribed spirit, whatever aberration or complexity it may 
display” (“Modern Fiction” 160–1)?
The complex anomalous moments Woolf would have us bear in 
mind in our efforts to speak to “what life is really like” are precisely 
what is at stake, with a vengeance, in Diamond’s exploration of the 
difficulty of reality. In casting her eye on the role of these moments 
of incomprehensibility in everyday life, and the way they resist fitting 
into established conceptual narratives, Diamond, too, attends to the 
“little deviations which the human spirit seems to make” when “life 
escapes,” as it were. In Diamond’s treatment of the difficulty of real-
ity, we find a philosophical response to Woolf’s rhetorical question 
about the task of the novelist. For in Diamond’s view, it is most cer-
tainly the task of the philosopher to convey life’s varying, unknown 
and uncircumscribed spirit, whatever aberration or complexity it may 
display. For striving to do just this is the only way to remain true to 
the realistic spirit she ascribes to Wittgenstein.
In a recent discussion of Diamond’s work on literature, riddles and 
the range of linguistic phenomena associated with expressions of ethi-
cal experience and religious belief, Stephen Mulhall examines the 
ways in which Diamond’s writing bears the mark of her inheritance 
from Wittgenstein in its commitment to representing the realistic 
spirit of life as accurately as possible—even when it resists established 
Wittgensteinian conventions of perspicuous representation (“Realism, 
Modernism and the Realistic Spirit”). Diamond’s own way of flouting 
convention, Mulhall claims, is consistent with the modernist novel’s 
commitment to “questioning the generic conventions it inherits in the 
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name of a more faithful representation of the real” (8).17 In an effort 
to remain true to Wittgenstein’s realistic spirit, Diamond shows herself 
willing to sacrifice the signature concepts with which Wittgenstein’s 
work is so often identified—“language games,” “grammar,” “forms of 
life,” etc. As Mulhall points out, Wittgenstein forged these representa-
tional devices in the service of redirecting our attention to the ways in 
which we actually use words in our lives, to return us to our actual life 
with language. Conceived by Wittgenstein as tools to be used the work 
of clarification, such concepts should possess the inherent flexibility 
needed to accommodate any pattern of word use that a person might 
employ. But if we allow these concepts to become hardened, they may 
in the end only narrow our sense of what the ordinary might be, and 
thereby risk betraying Wittgenstein’s most fundamental legacy.18 Of 
Diamond’s treatment of the difficulty of reality, Mulhall writes:
Diamond can properly acknowledge such difficulties only by…sacrificing 
one of the supposedly defining features of a distinctively Wittgensteinian 
approach to philosophy. For its business of returning words from their 
metaphysical to their everyday use (PI, 116) is usually glossed as a matter of 
rehousing words in the Heimat of ordinary language games. But properly to 
register the essential nature of a difficulty of reality asks us to acknowledge 
the capacity of reality to shoulder us out from our familiar language-games, 
to resist the distinctively human capacity to word the world, and thereby 
to leave us as bewildered and disorientated as a bird that suddenly finds 
itself incapable of constructing a nest, or a beaver of building a dam. (19)
What Diamond would have us see is that riddle phrases, nonsense 
phrases (forms of speaking that either lack meaning, exceed it, or 
defy our ordinary assignments of sense), as well as the failure of words 
17In this essay, Mulhall discusses three papers by Diamond: “Riddles and Anselm’s 
Riddle,” “Wittgenstein on Religious Belief: The Gulfs Between Us,” and “The Difficulty 
of Philosophy and the Difficulty of Reality.” Each focuses on distinctly ethico-religious 
concerns.
18As Mulhall writes:…if–like any other representational conventions–this set of signa-
ture concepts is sufficiently substantial or robust to acquire a life of its own, then they 
might on occasions stand between us and an ability simply to acknowledge how things 
really are; rather than helping to subvert our tendency towards the imposition of a 
philosophical “must,” they may actually subserve its further expression. And when a Witt-
gensteinian philosopher becomes so committed to the use of these signature concepts 
that he cannot conceive of another way of perspicuously representing the phenomena 
of our life with language when responding to a philosophical problem, then he has in 
effect imposed a set of philosophical preconditions on the reality he putatively aspires 
simply to describe. He has donned a set of Wittgensteinian conceptual spectacles; and 
by employing those concepts as lenses through which he views everything, he actively 
subverts the realistic spirit in which their creator forged and (at least attempted to) 
deploy them (“Realism, Modernism and the Realistic Spirit” 10–11).
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in the face of momentous experience in which reality surpasses our 
sense-making capacities, all nonetheless play a key role in the rich 
life with language that Wittgenstein seeks to display to us with clarity, 
even if they cannot be accounted for through his signature concepts. 
Such expressions are techniques of our language as any other. They 
are empty of linguistic sense, to be sure, but not of human use and 
significance.
In her examination of these phenomena, Diamond draws upon 
the insights she delivers in “Ethics, Imagination, and the Method 
of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus,” The Realistic Spirit and elsewhere about 
Wittgenstein’s view of nonsense, and our need—as good readers and 
moral agents—to pat attention to what Woolf calls “little devintions 
which the human spirit seems to make from time to time” by entering 
imaginatively into taking nonsense for sense in order to diagnose the 
confusion or understand the ethical impulse that lies at the source of 
that nonsense in the heart of its speaker. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein 
seeks to disabuse us of our tendency to succumb to metaphysical non-
sense. In the “Lecture on Ethics,” however, he gives us new insights 
into the role of nonsense in his thinking: Nonsensicality, he says there, 
is the “very essence” of sentences with which we give voice to our ethi-
cal experience. Expressions of ethical experience or religious belief 
represent cases in which our linguistic intentions are such that what 
we want to say is essentially incompatible with making sense. As Dia-
mond writes “sometimes the purposes with which we speak would not 
be served by sentences that makes sense” (“EIMT” 164). Any attempt 
to render an ethical sentence meaningful, Wittgenstein declares, he 
would reject, ab initio, “on the ground of its significance” (LE 44). 
Nonsense that “springs from a desire to say something about the ulti-
mate meaning of life,” he continues, is a “document of a tendency of 
the human mind” which he “cannot help respecting deeply” (LE 46). 
Diamond pays her own respects to the complex function of nonsense 
in our ethical lives through her attention to the riddles and difficulty 
so significant to the spirit of everyday reality.
In her essay on the difficulty of reality, Diamond draws upon 
Cavell’s reflections in “Notes and Afterthoughts on the Opening of 
Wittgenstein’s Investigations” on the philosophical difficulty of seeing 
the obvious. She writes: “it is within the everyday that there lie the 
forms and varieties of repudiation of our language-games and distance 
from them, the possibility of being tormented by the hiddenness, the 
separateness, the otherness of others” (“Difficulty” 77). An integral 
part of what makes the experience of such difficulty so traumatizing or 
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astounding is this: what the shouldered-out person sees as incompre-
hensible—awesome or astonishing in its beauty or grace or agonizing 
in its horror—is seen by others as utterly banal. As Mulhall puts it, 
“Difficulties of reality thereby serve to isolate individuals, disclosing 
others as opaque to them and themselves as opaque to others; Real-
ity’s resistance to our understanding reveals us as essentially resistant 
to one another’s understanding” (29).
In To the Lighthouse, Woolf grapples with a reality marked by such 
difficulty. She first creates a community of characters who are all, to 
different degrees, isolated from each other, laboring in the “extreme 
obscurity of human relationships” and striving both to guard their 
privacy and to make contact with the other, to gain access to what 
Lily Briscoe describes as the “dome-shaped hive” of their inner lives, 
to read the “tablets bearing their sacred inscriptions” (175; 43; 54). 
“All of them bending themselves to listen,” Woolf writes, thinking, 
“Pray heaven that the inside of my mind may not be exposed” (96).
In her essay, as I said, Diamond explores a range of phenomena to 
describe the difficulty of reality. Although her first examples deal with 
the traumas of life, death and the horror of what we do to animals, she 
also includes in her account “instances of goodness or beauty [that] 
can throw us” (“Difficulty” 60). One of the things Woolf offers at the 
center of her elegiac novel is a sense of general astonishment and 
awe at the existence of beauty—represented most fully in the figure 
of Mrs. Ramsay (whom Prue pronounces “the thing in itself” and Mr. 
Bankes “the happier Helen of our days,” the sight of whom, “reading 
a fairy tale to her boy had upon him precisely the same effect as the 
solution to a scientific problem”)—and a yearning not only somehow 
to grasp its mystery and grace, but to come to terms with the depth 
of its loss (118, 51). By offering us the reflections of the characters 
for whom the range of phenomena associated with the difficulty of 
reality is a pressing issue, Woolf also shows us that the reality of the 
Ramsay’s thriving world in “The Window” is one whose integrity war 
and death and the passage of time are always poised radically to alter 
if not obliterate.
In a precursor to the enigmatic narrative of “Time Passes,” the 
Ramsays’ daughter, Nancy (who shares her mother’s sense of the 
contingency of life as well as a Wittgensteinian affinity for the sense 
of cosmic magic and Godlike power the Grimm tale explores), stands 
alone over a tidal pool, intermittently casting “vast clouds over [the] 
tiny world by holding her hand against the sun” and bringing “dark-
ness and desolation, like God himself, to millions of ignorant and 
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innocent creatures,” before taking her hand away to let the sun stream 
down again.19 For Nancy,
…the two senses of that vastness and this tininess…flowering within it 
made her feel that she was bound hand and foot and unable to move by 
the intensity of feelings which reduced her own body, her own life, and the 
lives of all the people in the world, for ever, to nothingness (78).
If Diamond’s “difficulty of reality” finds a central locus in To the 
Lighthouse, its punctum is surely to be found in the abrupt, bracketed 
reports of the deaths of Mrs. Ramsay, Andrew and Prue in “Time 
Passes.” That these death notices stand in apparent contrast with the 
content of that section’s final bracketed statement—which delivers 
news of Mr. Carmichael’s successful volume of poems (“the war, it 
seems, had revived people’s interest in poetry”) is a question I will 
return to in the conclusion (138).
The sudden incursion of these asides into the “eyeless” quizzical 
narrative of a world falling into and being “fetched up” from oblivion 
underscores Nancy’s apprehension of the insignificance of individual 
human lives when seen against the vastness of the universe (even those 
who have been, but moments ago, absolutely alive and absolutely 
significant to the fictive community for which they were central, and 
to the reader, engaged imaginatively in that community) (143). The 
shocking impact of these understated reports of parenthetical death 
thus also gives readers a sense of the “contradictory permanent hor-
rors,” of the difficulty of reality, and works to shoulder them out from 
their experience of the world of the novel (thus far).
Describing the difficulty of reality, Diamond turns to literary exam-
ples which depict the bewildering phenomenon as an anomalous 
disturbance, a shocking experience of horror, grace or beauty, that 
is anchored in a concrete, particular event or object (a photograph, 
a dead baby, a seemingly miraculous act of sacrifice, the architecture 
of a tree). In To the Lighthouse, however, the difficulty of reality is 
more or less untethered from any acute particular event in the story, 
and haunts the novel in a pervasive, general way. It is present in the 
onslaught of darkness and undoing of “Time Passes” and the musings 
and enigmatic questions that pervade it. It is present in Mr. Ramsay’s 
melodramatic “phrase-making” about the “poor little world,” and in 
the refrains from Tennyson and Cowper he is overheard to recite in 
19For discussions of Wittgenstein’s fondness for Grimms’ fairy tales, see Fania Pas-
cal’s memoir in Rhees 33–4. See also Diamond’s discussion of Wittgenstein’s ethics in 
relation to Grimm’s “The Fisherman’s Wife” and of “Rumpelstiltskin” in her “Ethics, 
Imagination and the Method of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.”
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his moments of broken privacy (and which Woolf echoes pointedly in 
“Time Passes”) (TLP 72; Cowper 48). Mr. Ramsay’s thoughts of search 
parties and shipwrecks attest not only to his need for a script through 
which to express his own distinguishing tyrannical need for sympathy 
but also to his deep acquaintance with Cowper’s “obscurest night” in 
which, all “transient respite past” and “toil subdued,” we perish, each 
alone. The difficulty of reality is present in Mr. Ramsay’s recognition 
of “all sorts of horrors” that “seemed not to depress him” but which 
cause his wife to remark with a stark, uncustomary violence that “if 
she had said half what he said, she would have blown her brains out 
by now” (72–3).
Indeed, the difficulty of reality makes itself known from the novel’s 
very beginning. The “horrible permanent contradictions” within it 
take root in the tension between the ‘yes…but’ of its opening lines. 
The sense of possibility Mrs. Ramsay puts forth in her comforting 
response to her youngest child’s implicit question (can we go to the 
lighthouse?): “Yes, of course, if it’s fine tomorrow” is quickly staunched 
by her husband’s denial of the antecedent of his wife’s modus ponens, 
her “way that affirms by affirming”: “but it won’t be fine” (8). Mr. 
Ramsay damns his wife for hiding from their children that “life is 
difficult,” by saying things that “flew in the face of facts, made his 
children hope what was utterly out of the question, in effect, told 
lies” (35). Mrs. Ramsay, as we have seen, is herself deeply aware of 
“that lie”—that we are all in the hands of the Lord, as well as the lie 
implicit in her generously hopeful phrases and repeated promise to 
James. For the sense of possibility that she presents to her son and 
represents for her whole entourage is one she proffers in order to 
shield them from the darker and more threatening sense of possibil-
ity she herself intuits: that it won’t be at all fine tomorrow, that the 
uncertain future is perhaps but an abyss.
Mrs. Ramsay’s sense of possibility is always infused with an uncanny 
prescience of the passage of time as leading to potential annihilation, 
a ringing down of unimaginable death or oblivion on a world of 
people so visibly present and alive. Her difficulty of reality has to do 
with the strange sense that all that is alive and flourishing before her 
“has now come to an end,” is already over and done with, that “the 
lights of the town and of the harbour and of the boats seemed like a 
phantom net floating there to mark something which had sunk” (85, 
71). Already. Her attunement to the “darkness, spreading and unfath-
omably deep” of a general difficulty of reality that few others around 
her see or understand, is marked by an awareness of what Simone 
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Weil calls “affliction” (“unhappiness”—malheur) (65). Diamond calls 
our attention in her essay to Weil’s notion that:
Human thought is unable to acknowledge the reality of affliction. To 
acknowledge the reality of affliction means saying to oneself: ‘I may lose 
at any moment, through the play of circumstances over which I have no 
control, anything whatsoever that I possess, including those things which 
are so intimately mine that I consider them as being myself. There is noth-
ing that I might not lose. It could happen at any moment that what I am 
might be abolished and replaced by anything whatsoever of the filthiest 
and most contemptible sort. To be aware of this in the depth of one’s soul 
is to experience non-being. (70; qtd. in “Difficulty” 74–5)
In Simone Weil, Diamond finds an example of a philosopher who 
saw the difficulty of her philosophical work as the difficulty of keep-
ing to the awareness of affliction and of the difficulty of reality, of not 
being “deflected” from it, in Cavell’s sense, by turning to established 
related philosophical or moral debates and arguments apparently 
in the vicinity as a way of resolving the problem at hand.20 One of 
Diamond’s primary aims in her essay is to examine the ways in which 
certain works of literature can remain similarly engaged in a mode 
of understanding difficulties of reality that may be present “only in a 
diminished and distorted way in philosophical argumentation” that 
gives in to a tendency to turn a difficulty of the human condition so 
painful that it unseats reason into a factual, intellectual problem (“Dif-
ficulty” 69). Professional philosophy, Diamond points out, certainly 
knows how to deal with hard problems. But the hardness of a difficulty 
of reality is of a different order of difficulty from the hardness of a 
philosophical argument (“Difficulty” 58).
It is the non-being Weil speaks of that Mrs. Ramsay experiences 
as she vacillates between a sense of coherence and plenitude (“It 
is enough! It is enough!”) on the one hand and doom as a wedge-
shaped core of darkness on the other in her solitary reverie, and 
which Nancy experiences as a sense of nothingness at the tidal pool 
(68). It is this non-being that encroaches on Woolf’s narrative in the 
bracketed reports of “Time Passes.” That Mr. Carmichael’s creation 
of a volume of poetry, with its power to fill a need for the post-war 
audience should also be reported in these same brackets, however, 
provokes important questions about Woolf’s own sense of the power 
of literature in a post-war context—her literature in its context—to 
offer a creative, productive salve to combat the difficulty and affliction 
20See Cavell, “Knowing and Acknowledging” 238–66, and “Declining Decline” 29–76.
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she takes up in her novel (and this includes the skeptical problem of 
her surviving characters’ opacity to each other). I want to probe, by 
way of conclusion, this question, which seems especially pressing when 
considered alongside Diamond’s own questions about whether (and 
how) certain works of literature can be more adept in their treatment 
of the philosophical complexities of our ethical experience of the world 
than certain applied philosophical approaches and theories can be.
A few weeks after Mrs. Dalloway appeared in 1925, Woolf wrote down 
her now-famous speculation about a new name for her future work, a 
generic designation to supplant ‘novel’: “A new___ by Virginia Woolf. 
But what? Elegy?” (Diary III, 33). Christine Froula has argued that 
in Mrs. Dalloway and To the Lighthouse, Woolf adapts the tradition of 
pastoral elegy to a more modern public elegy, transposing to prose 
fiction the elegiac form of post-war mourning and moving on to 
(Milton’s) fresh woods and pastures new (126). I want to end here 
by reflecting on the ways in which To the Lighthouse is a work in which 
a search for lost time does become a therapeutic means of reanimat-
ing the novel’s present (and Woolf’s own). But attending to Woolf’s 
elegiac project as one that entails struggles with difficulties of reality, 
in Diamond’s sense, helps us to see that if the novel resolves with a 
productive sense of creative possibility, it is not quite because it aims 
to console. Rather, Woolf plumbs the depths of life’s most painful and 
confounding difficulty and contingency, and only then offers “some 
incorrigible hope” “twined about her dirge” (135). There are no fresh 
woods and pastures new for the Ramsays or even for Lily Briscoe. Only 
the same “poor little place,” now “much changed” (72; 152).
What Woolf offers us in the place of a neat resolution to her surviv-
ing characters’ attempts to emerge from their mutual isolation and 
affliction—through continued questions and quests for vision and 
unity—is a sort of frayed fairy-tale ending: Woolf sets the scene of 
separateness by endowing it with a magical simultaneity and parallel 
perspective (James, Cam and Mr. Ramsay in the boat, making their 
long-postponed trip to the lighthouse, and Lily with her painting on 
the lawn). It is not an enchanted flounder in Woolf’s story, as it is in 
the Grimms’, but a mutilated mackerel that is thrown back into the sea, 
and by and by the standstill in which all parties are stuck (the boat in 
the Mariner’s windless harbor and Lily puzzling before the “hideously 
difficult white space” of an empty canvas) is magically broken, as if 
to make way for a transformative forward movement toward the final 
culmination of their respective projects, and with it the evolution of 
the characters themselves toward an improved mutual understanding 
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they only reach through their shared individual experience of the 
difficulty of reality.
But does Woolf solve the skeptical problem so central to her novel 
by establishing unity among her characters? Not quite. Mr. Ramsay, 
for example, remains mysterious, private, unknown as he makes his 
leap onto the lighthouse rock as if proclaiming: “there is no God.” 
From his youngest children’s point of view, “…he might be thinking, 
We perished, each alone, or he might be thinking I have reached it, 
I have found it; but he said nothing” (210). Does Woolf “get at the 
truth of things” through Lily’s culminating vision? Not exactly. Lily’s 
revelation endures for but a fleeting epiphanic moment. It represents 
an “attempt at something that must be perpetually revisited and 
remade.” It has, after all, taken four separate moments of revelation 
and composition over a period of more than a decade for Lily to 
“smooth out something she had been given…years ago, folded up; 
something she had seen” and represent it “[w]ith a sudden intensity, 
as if she saw it clear for a second” in the line at the center of her 
completed painting (211). Her vision, in spite of its position in the 
novel, signaling finality and apparent plenitude, is still a revision. Her 
search, the narrative suggests, will continue even in its wake.
What Woolf does do by the end of the novel is to show us that while 
the experience of the difficulty of reality may isolate us from others, 
in certain cases, or to certain degrees, it can also work to bring people 
together. Woolf leaves us with the “incorrigible hope” of a continued 
(and shared) engagement with questions and quests for transforma-
tions that are always incomplete and visions that are always revisions, 
all of which go sounding on, long after the novel has ended. And it 
is with these questions and quests, Woolf seems to say, that separately 
and yet somehow together, “we remain” (133).
Tulane University
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